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dispel any lingering doubts that the existing anti money 
laundering requirements do not apply to dealings with 
possibly corrupt foreign officials.
The scale of fortunes acquired in recent cases like Abacha 
are so great there can be little scope for resisting the 
inference that they must have been acquired through some 
wrongdoing. A suspicious transaction is defined in the 
JMLSG Guidance Notes to be one, which is 'inconsistent 
with the customer's known legitimate business or personal 
activities'. The size of the transactions involved in such 
cases is so large that, absent an explanation, they were 
clearly inconsistent with the client's 'known legitimate 
business or personal activities' in which case the banks 
were (or at least ought to have been) suspicious. This 
means that all the elements of the offence under section 
93A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (as amended) is 
present. It remains to be seen whether a disclosure report 
was made, giving the bank a defence to criminal liability. 
Of course, such a report would not provide a defence to 
civil liability.
The spate of recent money laundering scandals suggests 
intermediaries in this country have laundered the 
proceeds of foreign corruption. They have led to an
impression that the law is deficient, which has perhaps 
prompted the preparation of the Guidelines. However, this 
impression is incorrect because, as I have mentioned, an 
offence would appear to have been committed. In any 
event, the Guidelines could not remedy any such 
deficiencies; quite apart from the uncertainty of the 
language used, the Guidelines are simply a voluntary code. 
Whilst the existing anti money laundering regime is not 
prefect, its objectives and effect are the same the 
Guidelines. The reason why these objectives and effects 
may not have been fulfilled is because of a failure to 
enforce the law. Both the Serious Fraud Office and the FSA 
have announced that they have initiated investigations into 
banks involved in handling funds on behalf of Abacha and 
this is something that the House of Commons 
International Development Committee is in the process of 
investigating. Hopefully this signals a determination to 
overcome past enforcement deficiencies. @
Toby Graham
Partner, Tavlor Johnson Garrett
Free speech and the 
Human Rights Act 1998
by Paul Kearns
The author considers the practical, constitutional and 
doctrinal implications for freedom of speech in the United 
Kingdom following the coming into force of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 on 2 October 2000.
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The incorporation of most of the articles of the European Convention on Human Rights into English law by the Human Rights Act 1998 has 
involved the quasi-constitutional step of activating a rights- 
based offensive for citizens against die foe of public 
authorities without the fully constitutional step of 
entrenchment. Freedom of expression, including symbolic 
as well as cognitive speech, is arguably the most primary of 
freedoms but it is not as highly prized under the European 
Convention as some suppose. In conflicts between free 
speech and religious lobbies, for example, free speech has
often been compromised by the preferred protection of 
threatened religious precepts, and, in general, the 
legitimate interferences with free speech are relatively 
broad despite the fact that in constitutional terms, in many 
national jurisdictions, freedom of expression is one of the 
most widely accepted rights, on which other rights, such as 
that of freedom of assembly, are frequently parasitic.
As McGoldrick and O'Donnell have lucidly pointed out, 
free speech has a powerful normative status which ensures 
that it generally receives a purposive interpretation, and 
the rationales for that special status have been the search
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for truth, the right to individual self-fulfilment and the
' to
importance of everyone's full communicative 
participation in a democracy. In free speech litigation, one 
first has to identify the specific category of free speech 
involved, and then analyse it in terms of the wealth of 
rationales for freedom of speech, including, notably, its 
limitation. The complex case law result emerges, ideally, 
from a very careful balancing of various rights, interests 
and values that impact on the free speech terrain 
concerned.
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, from which the free speech provision in the 
Human Rights Act 1998 is drawn, provides:
'(I) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right 
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless ojfrontiers. This Article shall not prevent states from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties 
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
and crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection 
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.'
With the assistance of an excellent overview by Wadham 
and Mountfield, the following general observations can be
' to to
made: The free speech right contained in Article 10 
concerns the freedom to hold ideas, and to receive options 
and information, as well as the right to express them, and 
the concept 'expression' covers words, pictures, images 
and actions intended to express an idea or to present 
information. A personal opinion is that the non-cognitive 
as a category, such as represented by abstract art, is also 
covered, so expression may be a more accurate term in 
this context than speech. Article 10 does not create a 
general right to freedom of information but, a little
o o '
paradoxically, it can assist someone who is prevented from 
receiving information. In the United Kingdom, the 
recently en-acted Freedom of Information Act 2000 goes 
some way to creating a right to information but only in 
certain strictly-circumscribed circumstances.
A wide range of types of expression is protected by 
Article 10 including political speech, which is the type 
given highest priority by the European Convention on 
Human Rights in practice (Bowman v United Kingdom (1998) 
26 EHRR 1). Also covered are journalistic speech, artistic 
'speech' and commercial speech, the relevant case law- 
being, respectively, Good-win v United Kingdom (1996) 22 
EHRR 123, Mutter v Switzerland (1988) 13 EHRR 212 and 
Colman v United Kingdom (1993) 18 EHRR 119. The
European Court of Human Rights has rather 
disingenuously disavowed a theoretical basis for such 
distinctions between types of speech. Another doctrinal 
problem for the Court has been the correct balance to be 
achieved between the importance of the right to freedom 
of expression and the rights and freedoms of others. This 
is unsurprising because the right of freedom of expression 
can often jeopardise competing social interests such as the 
respect for thought, conscience and religion, the privacy of 
others, the protection of the democratic process and the 
right to a fair trial. However, it is reassuringly clear from 
the case law that the Court requires strong justification for 
interfering with the right to free speech, which is a matter 
of some detail to be considered later in this article.
The juridicial zone of free speech issues encompasses 
areas of official secrecy, privacy and obscenity, and it is 
these three subjects that form the basis of the ensuing 
discussion, though mention will be made of other issues7 to
for the sake of universality of comprehension for the 
reader.
In Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights the various legitimate reasons for restricting freeto to to
speech are set out. In terms of official secrecy, first, the 
relevant controls include those which are in the interests 
of national security. Like the English courts, the European 
Court of Human Rights has not given a clear indication of
o o
what exactly comprises 'national security'. The infamous 
Spycatcher cases demonstrate, though, that the issue is 
definitely justifiable. In The Observer and Guardian v United 
Kingdom (1991) 14 EHRR 153, the European Court of 
Human Rights held that an interference intended to 
maintain the authority of judges pending trial, and to 
preserve national security, pursued legitimate objectives. It 
was deemed by the Court necessary in a democratic 
society to interfere by way of injunction to conserve 
national security confidentiality. However, once the salient 
information was no longer confidential, the objective of 
preserving confidence in the security services had already 
been realised by initiating proceedings, and was 
insufficient to interfere with the right protected by Article 
10.
Information that affects criminal investigations 
constitutes secret information and a limitation on 
publication can accordingly be justified on the basis of the 
secrecy objective. Article 10(2) also covers the prevention 
of disclosure of matter received in confidence, which can, 
of course, be used where relevant to embrace government7 o
information. Article 10 applies to members of the security 
services and the civil service and it is not yet clear how 
Article 10 will apply to 'whistleblowers' who seek to reveal 
information under the Official Secrets Act 1989 on the 
foundation of 'public interest'. At the moment, in 
England, there is no watertight defence available in suchto ' to
instances. Commentator Rambert de Mello has noted 
that, in cases pertaining to national security, the domestic 11
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court is not usually inclined to examine the subject matter 
before the public authority concerned to ascertain 
whether its decision was correct. This may change under 
the Human Rights Act 1998 in the shape of an expectation 
of investigation by the court. In the area of official secrecy, 
then, the law is somewhat, as yet, inchoate.
On the topic of secrecy, one of the fundamental 
requirements for freedom of the press is the protection of 
journalists' sources. An order for the disclosure of any 
source is prima facie incompatible with Article 10 unless 
it can be convincingly justified under the Article 10(2) 
derogations.
o
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
provides:
'(I) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence'
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with 
the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection 
of health or morals, or for the protection of health or morals, or 
for the protection of rights and freedoms of others.'
How this privacy right will affect institutions like the 
media is a matter for debate. Since the right can only apply 
against public authorities, the BBC is arguably the only 
feasible media body to be directly affected according to 
media law specialist Peter Carey. Nevertheless, a not 
untenable view is that domestic courts come within the 
'public authority' nomenclature and that the domestic 
judiciary has a consequent obligation to develop the 
common law in England to ensure more extensive 
compliance with the European Convention rights 
including the privacy provision. However, a person 
claiming infringement of his privacy right under Article 8 
must show that his private or family life has been 
disrespected by a media body and such disrespect may be 
difficult to prove in the absence of sufficiently intrusive 
media action as has already been deemed to contravene 
the privacy right in already existing European Court of 
Human Rights cases.
o
The interaction of the right to free speech and the right 
to privacy is very interesting virgin territory under the 
Human Rights Act 1998. Although the Act specifies that 
'particular regard' must be had to freedom of expression 
where that right is affected by an action, it is not an
o J '
absolute right, and a notoriously conservative judiciary in 
England may well create a privacy right of greater strength 
than most commentators expect, not least given the 
Article 10 (2) attention paid to the rights and reputations 
of others. Respecting the legislation, though, the balance is 
clearly tilted in favour of free speech by courtesy of section 
12 of the 1998 Act. This provides that where a court is 
considering whether to grant any relief, which, if granted,
might affect the exercise of the Convention right to 
freedom of expression, it must:
'Have particular regard to the importance of the Convention 
right to freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to 
material which the respondent claims, or which appears to the 
court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic material (or conduct 
connected with such material), to  
(a) the extent to which  
(i) the material has, or is about to, become available to 
the public; or
(ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the 
material to be published;
(b) any relevant privacy code.'
No such relief is to be granted in the absence of the 
respondent unless the court is satisfied that the applicant 
has taken all practical steps to notify them and/or it is 
satisfied that there are compelling reasons why they should 
not be notified. There is no prior restraint of any 
publication before trial unless the court is likely to 
establish that publication should not be allowed. Steven 
Greer is of the opinion that s. 12 is a welcome provision 
even though it could have been more clearly drafted. Its 
merit lies in the fact that it is the only part of the 1998 Act 
that seeks to clarify the relationship between two 
Convention rights in such a specific and detailed manner. 
That scheme ensures that all the appropriate facts are 
properly considered in any given dispute.
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights is also very relevant to matters of obscenity and 
indecency. Here there is a derogation the state can utilise 
on the basis of 'protection of health or morals' and such 
restrictions have been deemed permissible by the 
Strasbourg institutions as legitimate limitations on free
o o
speech in this sensitive area. According to Richard Stone, 
the European Court of Human Rights' decisions may not 
be very helpful because in this field of allegedly immoral 
publications the Court has granted a notably extensive 
'margin of appreciation' to domestic jurisdictions. This 
concept is one of subsidiarity whereby a state is allowed a 
degree of latitude in its application of the relevant law 
without interference by a supra-national European human 
rights standard. To come within this allowable ambit the
o
state control must be 'prescribed by law', promote a 
'legitimate aim' and be 'necessary in a democratic society' 
for the achievement of the specific objective of the 
measure. In Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 
737, the Court used the 'margin of appreciation' device to 
extend appropriate discretion to the contracting state in 
the following way:
'The Contracting States have each fashioned their approach in 
the light of the situation obtaining in their respective territories; 
they have had regard, inter alia, to the different views prevailing 
there about the demands of the protection of morals in a
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democratic society. Thejact that most of them decided to allow 
the work (under consideration) to be distributed does not mean 
that (any) contrary decision was a breach of Article 10.'
Controversially, in Wingrove v United Kingdom (1997) 24 
EHRR 1, state discretion was also permitted regarding the 
English censorship mechanism regulating videos and films. 
Nigel Wingrove made a short video called Visions of Ecstasy 
in which he depicted the ecstatic visions of Saint Teresa of 
Avila in an erotic way. The British Board of Film 
Classification (BBFC) having refused the film a certificate, 
Wingrove ultimately appealed to the Strasbourg 
institutions. The European Court of Human Rights 
upheld the national decisions as not invoking a breach of 
Article 10 because, although the application of blasphemy 
laws was deemed rare, and prior restraint called for 
particular scrutiny, the concern of the English BBFC that 
the public distribution of the video might 'outrage and 
insult the feelings of believing Christians' meant that the
O O
censorship could not be said to be an 'arbitrary or 
excessive' measure. This is a most unsatisfactory result for 
advocates of free speech, involving the abdication of 
judicial responsibility for imposing a morality in line with 
more liberal European mores.
Despite Wingrove, Janis, Kay and Bradley, authorities on 
European human rights law, claim that from the 
standpoint of bringing national law in conformity with 
Convention rights, the Human Rights Act 1998 goes a long
o ' O o o
way; but much depends on the response of the national 
judiciary. A little-observed matter not specifically 
addressed by the Act is the degree to which the domestic 
courts may re-state common law rules where these are 
inconsistent with the Convention. This is probably going 
to be less revolutionary than some liberals expect but the 
Act at least resolves the principal problems caused by the 
application of a treaty unincorporated in domestic law and 
aspires to have profound constitutional significance as a 
liberalising measure that judges are at least at liberty to 
galvanise in forthcoming case law.
There are several possibilities as to how the concept of 
the 'margin of appreciation' will mutate in domestic law 
within the specific context of Article 10. Since free speech 
encompasses both artistic and cultural expression it is 
feasible that it will be held necessary in a democratic 
society to protect objects of religion from unwarranted 
aggression. This is certainly in line with the European 
Court of Human Rights' prevailing policy of promoting 
freedom of religion as a specifically valued ideal. One can 
also envisage that when a public authority seeks to gag the 
press, its power to restrict free speech may be interpreted 
narrowly since one significant role of the press is to impart 
valuable information and even information that is arguably 
'hate speech'. If the public is not explicitly concerned 
about business confidentiality between various interested 
parties, it may be that in such circumstances restriction of 
publication of such matter will constitute justifiable
interference with the freedom under Article 10. However, 
the derogations in Article 10(2) must be interpreted 
narrowly or restrictively under European human rights law 
governed by Strasbourg. This has a particular significance 
for moral issues, an area where restraints on national 
oppression are theoretically and actually provided. If free 
speech is used too abusively, so as to in effect deny the 
abused of one of his or her other rights, restraint of the
o '
speech is conceivable, even if only a proposition deriving 
from the dissenting opinion of judges Palm, Pekkanen and
Makarczyk in Otto-Preminger Institut v Austria (1994) 19 
EHRR 34 at paras. 7 and 8.
As a matter of practice, actions taken by a public authority 
will not be held to be contrary to the European Convention 
on Human Rights on the basis that they are not the optimal 
measures in the view of a court, provided that the actions 
come within a relatively small array of permissible 
alternatives. These comprise the exercise of a degree of 
latitude on the question of Article 10(2) restrictions, as 
previously witnessed supra; a course of conduct in executing 
its duties under statute that does not infringe Convention 
rights; a fresh evaluation of facts presented to the decision- 
maker, and the choice of measures it deems appropriate in 
accordance with European Convention exemplars. A 
domestic court is obligated to consider all relevant 
arguments including, crucially, whether the reasons given by 
the public authority for its decision are relevant and 
sufficient under Article 10(2).
At present, the Human Rights Act 1998 cannot be 
equated with a Bill of Rights and, in the absence of 
entrenchment, will have to be assessed in this context only 
after a number of years of operation. It is difficult to 
hypothesise about its eventual constitutional status given 
its short period in force to date. Nevertheless, a major 
factor in the profundity of its impression on English law 
rests with the judiciary, which may be conservative, activist 
or dynamic in its corporate application of the Act's 
potentially far-reaching content. There may be common 
law upheaval of a magnitude that requires a reappraisal of 
the Act's practical constitutional position in relation to 
sovereignty and written constitutionality. In the specific 
context of free speech, which was merely a rather inert 
residual liberty in England rather than an invokable right 
of citizens prior to the Act, it can be said that the 
legislation refreshes and modernises our heavily traditional 
constitutional framework in favour of more scope for 
original debate and artistic and other creativity. This is a 
requirement not only of the globalised post-modernism 
that surrounds our law but also of the European Union to 
which our commitment in terms of constitutional 
methods is unlikely to remain dormant for much 
longer. ©
Dr Paul Kearns
Lecturer in Law, University of Manchester
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